Action research,
transformational influences:
pasts, presents and
futures
Jean McNiff
This series of lectures is about action research and its pasts, presents and futures. To use the typology outlined by Chomsky (1986) in his Knowledge of Language, and to shift the focus slightly, it is about the origins, nature and uses of action research. The lectures are taking place because, on March 12th 2008, the day of the Research Fair of the Faculty of Education and Health Sciences, when we spoke about the action research work in the University of Limerick, a number of colleagues expressed an interest in knowing more about action research, where it had come from, where it was, and what might be the chances of developing it further. So these are the points I will speak about today. I shall organise this presentation in terms of
The lecture therefore stands as an
introductory overview, because I hope, in later lectures, to invite colleagues
from elsewhere in
Before we begin, let me outline my own position as an action researcher.
I have been working with action research
since the late 1970s, and will tell part of the story shortly. I am committed
to the idea that people can, and should, investigate and offer explanations for
their practices to show how they hold themselves accountable for what they are
doing. This involves asking, ‘How do I improve my practice?’ (Whitehead 1989),
and acting on personal evaluations for organisational and social improvement.
This form of research has come to be known as the new scholarship (Boyer 1990;
Schön 1995) and is celebrated globally as a powerful form of research-based
professionalism. It is active here in the
Before I continue with my own story, I have
to acknowledge that there is a lot of action research work going on in UL, and
it has a history and a context. In a moment I will ask Roland Tormey to give an
outline of what he is doing as he coordinates the Ubuntu network in

Mary is one of five primary teachers who have received their PhDs in the last two years. You can download and read their accounts as follows (in order of graduation):
· Bernie Sullivan (2006) A Living Theory of a Practice of Social Justice: Realising the Right of Traveller Children to Educational Equality: retrieved 17 May 2008 from http://www.jeanmcniff.com/bernieabstract.html
· Máirín Glenn (2006) Working with collaborative projects: my living theory of a holistic educational practice. Retrieved 17 May 2008 from http://www.jeanmcniff.com/glennabstract.html
· Caitríona McDonagh (2007) My living theory of learning to teach for social justice: How do I enable primary school children with specific learning disability (dyslexia) and myself as their teacher to realise our learning potentials? Retrieved 17 May 2008 from http://www.jeanmcniff.com/mcdonaghabstract.html
· Mary Roche (2007) Towards a living theory of caring pedagogy: interrogating my practice to nurture a critical, emancipatory and just community of enquiry. Retrieved 17 May 2008 from http://www.jeanmcniff.com/MaryRoche/index.html
· Margaret Cahill (2007 My living educational theory of inclusional practice. Retrieved 17 May 2008 from http://www.jeanmcniff.com/margaretcahill/index.html
I hope these five practitioner-researchers will present their work as the main body of one of the lectures in this programme.
The existence
of these PhD theses has institutional, national and global significance. The
institutional significance lies in the fact that five PhD completions using a
self-study action research methodology positions UL as occupying a distinctive
place in Irish third level education, as a university recognised for
legitimating the workplace action enquiries of practitioners at the highest
level of scholarship, and showing what it means to develop egalitarian and
transformational practices both in the workplace and in relation to the
co-creation of educational knowledge. I may be mistaken but I think I am right
in saying that UL is the first university in
The significance of the work at UL at national level is that it constitutes a recognised knowledge base that carries profound meaning in terms of its content. Each of the validated doctoral theses engages with issues of social justice. This addresses Noffke’s (1997) concerns that, although action research may be a powerful means for individual development, it has not the transformational capacity for social and cultural change. I would say, in response, that the current work enables us to see how it is possible to transform personal development into social and cultural wellbeing through contributing to the education of social formations in relation to what it means to live a peaceful and productive life.
The significance at global level is that UL is positioned as a university committed to contributing to a new scholarship of educational knowledge (Whitehead 2008a; http://www.jackwhitehead.com/aerictr08/jwictr08key.htm ). While other people may talk about it, UL is doing it, and so fulfilling its mission statement of learning for action. The question, however, arises, ‘Action for what?’, and I consider this when I give a brief overview of the origins, nature and purposes of action research.
Before I do so, however, I would like to draw attention to, and celebrate some more of the work going on in UL. Here is Roland Tormey to speak about what he is doing as he coordinates the Ubuntu network.
ROLAND TORMEY
Now let’s return to the questions that inspired this presentation and give a brief overview of action research: what it is, where it came from, and how you do it. Most importantly, whether we can we all do it, and why we should.
I get invited to different countries around the world to talk about action research, and I usually do interactive presentations. When I negotiate the content of the workshop with participants, I find that most people want to know, ‘What is action research? Where did it come from? How do you do it? Can I do it?’ These are the same questions asked by colleagues at the Research Fair, so this is where I will begin.
The first question is, ‘What is action research?’ A brief response is that action research is a way of investigating your practice in order to improve it. It is a rigorous methodology that begins with a question of the form, ‘How do I improve my practice?’ (Whitehead 1989), in response to the experience of oneself as a living contradiction when values are denied in practice. It continues through a process of data gathering and generating evidence in relation to identified criteria and standards of judgement, as a means of testing the validity of emerging claims to knowledge. Provisional findings are presented for the critical scrutiny of others, through testing the validity of the claim to check the extent to which values have been realised in practice, as well as drawing on the criteria of social validity identified by Habermas (1987). These are to ensure that, in making their knowledge claims, the researcher demonstrates the following:
The descriptions and explanations offered therefore stand as the researcher’s own living theory of practice. You can find an easy guide to these ideas at http://www.jeanmcniff.com/booklet1.html.
What I have outlined presents one view of action research. Other views exist, some of which I believe are limited in their scope and degree of theoretical analysis, as I now explain. I will explain this by doing some historical work, and speaking about how different views have emerged.
The first point I will make is about the public agreements and disagreements that have emerged over time about action research.
Twenty years ago, if you had asked, ‘What is action research?’ you would have received a reasonably direct answer. Up to about 1990, action research was seen as a fairly unified body of knowledge. Although people may have disagreed about its nature and uses (I will come to this), there would have been a reasonably unified stance about what action research was.
A working definition was published in 1988 by Kemmis and McTaggart, as follows:
Action research is a form of collective self-reflective enquiry undertaken by participants in social situations in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own social or educational practices, as well as their understanding of these practices and the situations in which these practices are carried out … The approach is only action research when it is collaborative, though it is important to realise that the action research of the group is achieved through the critically examined action of individual group members.
(Kemmis and McTaggart 1988: 5–6, emphasis in original)
A year later, in 1989, in response to
global interest in the increasingly influential action research phenomenon, and
the desire to distinguish it from other forms of educational research at the
time, a group of prominent action researchers at the International Symposium on
Action Research in
· people reflect and improve (or develop) their own work and their own situations
· by tightly interlinking their reflection and action
· and also making their experience public not only to other participants but also to other persons interested in and concerned about the situation (i.e. their (public) theories and practices of the work and the situation)
and if yours is a situation in which there is
increasingly
· data-gathering by participants themselves (or with the help of others) in relation to their own questions
· participation (in problem-posing and in answering questions) in decision making
· power-sharing and the relative suspension of hierarchical ways of working towards industrial democracy
· collaboration among members of the group as a ‘critical community’
· self-reflection, self-evaluation and self-management by autonomous and responsible persons and groups
· learning progressively (and publicly) by doing and by making mistakes in a self-reflective spiral of planning, acting, observing, reflection, replanning, etc.
· reflection which supports the idea of the ‘(self-) reflective practitioner’
then
· yours is a situation in which ACTION RESEARCH is occurring.
(cited in Zuber-Skerritt 1996: 14)
Inevitably, however, the situation around public consensus did not last long, if indeed it had ever been the case.
As noted, if you were to go into an action
research shop today, you would find many different brands, from which you would
have to choose if you wanted to do action research. The main differences are in
relation to their underpinning epistemologies and logics (see below). I am not
sure that you could mix the different versions, unless you wished to come up
with an experimental concoction. This kind of proliferation of interpretations
of a concept is inevitable, given the rapid spread of action research, and
given the transformational nature of any communication of ideas. When an idea
takes hold, it rapidly develops a family, and the family often becomes a
diaspora. I have heard some amazing statistics about the number of Irish
Americans who claim
What also happens is that the siblings begin to lose touch with one another and with their common family heritages, and this is what is happening in action research. It is especially noticeable in action research, because action research is about people and their discourses, and discourses are about human interests, which also take a range of forms, as Habermas (1972) noted. So people come to use ideas that appeal to their interests, and this is what has happened in action research. My concerns are mainly to do with how action research continues to be seen in many quarters simply as a method to get things done, not as a methodology that involves theoretical analysis. It is seen as a means of professional development, not as a means of knowledge creation. Appreciating this distinction is crucial if we are to explain how we understand quality in action research and demonstrate the validity of our knowledge claims to have improved our practices as the grounds for producing our explanations of how and why we have done so.
Let me examine the reasons for the differences. This can be best communicated through the historical story of action research. Here is a brief history, which addresses the second question, ‘Where did action research come from?’
Action research is reputed to have begun in
the 1930s, in the
Action research was quickly taken up as a methodology for social change, especially in education, and the appearance of Corey’s (1953) Action Research to Improve School Practices signalled its establishment within the social sciences. Yet this success was to be short lived, for, with the launch of Sputnik in the 1950s, a new focus emerged on technical excellence, and action research fell into a state of disrepair.
It jumped the ocean, to the

At that time, I was a deputy headteacher,
in
This brief history begins to explain where the differences in approaches to action research lie.
First I will say what the differences are not.
The differences are not in relation to the paradigmatic positioning of action research as a form of human enquiry. This is revealed in a brief excursion through the paradigms of human enquiry since the onset of the Enlightenment.
At the onset of the Enlightenment, the aim was to understand the physical world. The picture that emerged was as follows:

The object of enquiry was the natural world. The question the researcher asked took the form, ‘What is happening out there? Why is it happening?’ The aim of the enquiry was to offer descriptions for what was happening in the natural world, analyses for how it was happening, and explanations for why it was happening.
We know that descriptions, analyses and explanations together spell ‘theory’; and, given that the aim of all research is to generate new knowledge and theory, the descriptions and explanations that the researcher offered about the world became the researcher’s theory of the world they experienced. This stance continues today, and is the basis of most scientific enquiry.

This idea that the world could be investigated as an objective phenomenon became problematic during the nineteenth century when the object of enquiry changed from the natural world to people, with the growing interest in disciplines such as anthropology. Note that the person generating the theory was still the researcher, adopting an external stance, now asking, ‘What are they doing? Why are they doing it?’ and offering theories about other people’s behaviour.

The problematic lay in the fact that the methods of the natural sciences were applied unproblematically to the social sciences, and not appreciating that, while rocks and trees do not answer back, people do. So when the researcher continued to offer theories for what people were doing, the people became annoyed. It would be the same as me saying that I could offer explanations for your lives. If I were you, I would feel rather annoyed. No propositional theory can offer an explanation for my life. Yet this is what happened then, and continues to happen today.
The situation became deeply problematic post World War I, when new ideas emerged about the need to engage critically with how particular social situations come into being, and how they are shaped by particular political, economic, cultural and historical forces. This led to a powerful new movement known as critical theory. People started thinking about how they should take action to improve their lives. A distinctive feature of critical theory is, however, that people never actually moved into action; they talked about it, but they did not do it. From the perspective of generating theory, the research stance remained the same: the external researcher continued to observe people as they talked about taking action, and produced propositional theories about the need to take action and why to do it.

The situation changed again when new ideas emerged about the need to take action. This is when new action theories appeared, including social activity theorists and rational actor theories. The theoretical position however stayed the same: an external observer continued to generate propositional theories about what people were doing and why they were doing it.
So, while the object of enquiry changed (on the right hand side of the images), within real-world shifts in the historical and social environment, the form of theory (on the left) stayed the same. Although different paradigms emerged within human enquiry itself, the form of theorising went unquestioned. The form of theory was premised on certain principles: the Aristotelian Law of the Excluded Middle, which said that no contradiction in theorising was possible (Popper, 1963, called any theory that contained a contradiction ‘a loose and woolly way of thinking’); a commitment to ‘the scientific method’, the idea of causal relationships, and objective statistical analysis as a means of interpreting findings. Validity could be demonstrated through the realisation of criteria such as generalisability and replicability. The assumption was that the world could be known on the basis of these principles, and the knowledge would be true and for all time.
This model remains for much traditional research today, including action research. Propositional theories are offered by official researchers about how people take action in order to improve their circumstances. This situation is known generally as the ‘theory–practice gap’: the theory remains with the external researcher, while the practice is done by the practitioners who are being studied. Theory and practice become not only separate realms of discourse, but also act as separate locations of different kinds of power and their conceptualisation. The contradictions are evident to anyone who wishes to ask critical questions: the injustice of one researcher investigating the practices of another while maintaining that they are committed to social justice; the unquestioned assumptions that this is the way it should be by all parties who say they believe in critical engagement: and so on.
A significant break happened in the 1970s, through the work of Jack Whitehead, who began to question the rationality and justice of traditional forms of theory, and the need to move from method to methodology. He extended the focus of enquiry to include not only what was happening in the social field, but also what was happening in processes of theory generation. The focus of enquiry shifted from externalist forms (E-theories) to internalist forms (I-theories). The aim of the enquiry was to find ways of improving practice through what later became known as self-study action research. The purpose of the research was to generate living theories of practice that explained processes of improvement. Hence the aim became to find ways of transforming the social and cultural order while at the same time transforming the form of theory used to conceptualise those processes.
This was a real paradigm shift, commensurate with similar concurrent shifts in a range of disciplines such as linguistics (Chomsky 1986) and literary studies (Norris 1983). New research questions emerged. Instead of ‘What are they doing? How can it be understood?’, questions took the form, ‘What am I doing? How do I understand it?’

New commitments emerged, to understand the world from one’s own point of view, as a person claiming originality and exercising their responsibility with universal intent (Polanyi 1958: 327). The individual researcher, the ‘living I’, realised that they were never alone; they were an ‘I’ is in company with other ‘I’s, also finding ways of improving what they are doing. The theoretical form shifted from the production of propositional theories about other people’s thinking and actions, to the creation of personal living theories about the individual’s own thinking and actions. This led to a two-pronged focus in action research, on (1) what was happening in the social world, and (2) the form of theory most appropriate to explaining it. In recent work, the research focus of Whitehead and myself has shifted again, to show the integration of the two strands in the production of living theories of practice, through developing an understanding of how the transformations in the underpinning logical form transform into transformations in the form of practice (McNiff and Whitehead 2006; Whitehead and McNiff 2006). Logics, values, epistemologies, methodologies and practices are dynamically related and integrated aspects of the life of a living individual, when they ask, ‘How do I improve what I am doing?’ We take an ecological view to action enquiry as not just about an appropriate method for doing projects, but also as a manifestation of a life of enquiry.
This historical analysis points to the main differences between traditional forms of scholarship and new forms of scholarship. Now let’s consider what the differences are.
The main differences lie in the underpinning logics and values of the different theoretical approaches.
If we adopt a minimalist approach (see Chomsky 2000) to understanding the field, we can say that practice is informed by values and logics working together, as follows:

Values, what we believe in, permeate everything we do. They inform our theories about the world, and give meaning to our lives. Here again is problematic territory, because people interpret the idea of values according to which values they hold. Some people, such as Rawls (1971) and Raz (2003), speak about values as abstract phenomena, such as this thing called ‘justice’ or ‘freedom’, from a perspective of propositional logic. The influential book A Theory of Justice contains a propositional theory of justice, but does not contain one example of how justice can be accomplished in contexts of injustice. Rawls does not say how he practises justice. The book exists as a hypothetical treatise. Hypothetical treatises do not actually achieve justice for anyone. On the other hand, practitioners such as Sullivan (2006), from a perspective of generating theory within and from practice, produce their living theory accounts to show how they embody justice in the way they live; the Abstract becomes Concrete in real-life lived practice. The living theories of people like Sullivan (2006) and Cahill (2007) show how the researchers incorporate the propositional theories of Rawls and Raz in their accounts, to strengthen the validity of their accounts and to contribute scholarly knowledge to their field.
Logics refers to the way we think. Contrary to popular belief, there are different kinds of logic: propositional logic, dialectical logic and inclusional logic.
Traditional propositional logic is premised on Aristotelian ideas about causal relationships between phenomena. Propositional logic gives rise to propositional theory. The validity of the theory is understood in terms of the conceptual and formal relationships between statements. Pring (2000) says:
‘Theory’ would seem to have the following
features. It refers to a set of propositions which are stated with sufficient
generality yet precision that they explain the ‘behaviour’ of a range of
phenomena and predict what would happen in future. An understanding of those
propositions includes an understanding of what would refute them – or at
least what would count as evidence against their being true.
(Pring 2000: 124–5)
Dialectical logic, which has a long history, holds that contradiction is the nucleus of theory. Drawing on the work of Ilyenkov (1977), Whitehead (1989) posed the idea that an action enquiry begins when the researcher experiences themselves as a living contradiction when their values are denied in their practices. The enquiry then focuses on how to resolve the contradiction by finding ways to live in the direction of those values more effectively.
Inclusional logics, a term coined by Rayner (see his 2008) and developed by Whitehead (2008a), draw on ideas from ecology, spirituality, interconnectivity, and dynamic relational awareness. It is an idea that understands the world as a whole, as not capable of being divided or fragmented, and people within the world as part of their universe. The universe is always already embodied within themselves, themes resonant of the work of Bohm (1993), Capra (2003) and Bateson (1979). A special element of inclusional logics is the kind of relationships that Buber (1947) speaks about, which transform from ‘I-It’ to ‘I-Thou’, when the person sees themselves as separate from creation or a living part of it. These views are not themselves exclusive: an inclusional, living perspective requires the inclusion of propositional forms within itself. Nothing is excluded.
This is a view I also hold. In 1984, in my first published work, I produced the following diagram to communicate the dynamic evolutionary processes of my own life and thinking. This has stayed with me (McNiff 2002), although I have refined my understandings of its significance, and some of the implications.

So these are the matters I wish to address now, and I ask my next questions: How do you do action research? What is happening in the world of action research?
Interest in action research is growing. You can see this from the number of books, papers and articles and presentations in the public domain. A glance through the programme of the American Educational Research Association or the British Educational Research Association reveals that, in 1995, presentations on action research and related topics were few and far between, whereas in 2008 they are everywhere.
One of the reasons for its popularity is in its common-sense approach to real-life dilemmas. However, although common-sense, the methodology is highly rigorous. A popular set of questions is the following (see Whitehead 1989; McNiff and Whitehead 2006; Whitehead and McNiff 2006):
You can download the booklet on Action Research for Professional Development that addresses these issues in an accessible way from http://www.jeanmcniff.com/booklet1.html. You can also see many examples of this action reflection cycle at http://www.actionresearch.net, as I shortly explain.
The set of questions enables action researchers to offer their explanations for their practice, in the form of their living educational theories, and to articulate the originality, significance and rigour of their action research. Specifically, they are able to do the following:
I now want to look at how the idea of practitioners generating their living theories of practice is being developed around the world, and how a global knowledge base is developing to show the spread of their influence. This is in line with Snow’s (2001) call for a global knowledge base to show the systematisation of teachers’ enquiries (I extend ‘teachers’ to ‘practitioners’ because I believe that education is not confined to the teaching profession but extends across all aspects of human interaction, in bus queues as well as in formal classrooms.)
The most valuable source of information
about the global spread of the ideas is to be found at www.actionresarch.net, where Jack
Whitehead has provided a comprehensive database. You can access accounts of
work from
My own website, www.jeanmcniff.com, which is nowhere near
so well developed, contains details of some of the work at UL and in
I have also been working in
The key issue for action research in recent years has been to demonstrate how quality may be judged through testing the validity of accounts. In 2005, Furlong and Oancea pointed out that, while practitioner research was widely accepted as a powerful form of professional development, it could not be taken seriously as a form of knowledge creation, given that the criteria and standards for judging its validity had not yet been well worked out by the action research community. For years, this has been a sticking point, addressed by many, including Bassey (1999) and Feldman (2003), but as yet unsatisfactorily, since there was no agreement among the community of practitioner researchers about what kind of criteria and standards should be used for judging the quality of action research. A new approach has been developed in recent years that is grounded in the idea of values, in that the values that inspire an inquiry come to act as the living standards of judgement for the enquiry (Whitehead 2004; Whitehead and McNiff 2006). This approach is gaining currency.
A second and increasingly significant problem, as I see it, lies in practices of demonstrating the legitimacy of the accounts. This brings me to my own current main interests, working in third level education, and engaging with Habermas’s (1975) ideas about the legitimation crisis in what counts as knowledge and who decides. My concerns are about how academic staffs need to engage with their own action enquiries in order to make sound judgements about the quality of the work they are supervising and examining. I have several linked reasons for my focus, to do with social justice, the credibility of the Academy as an arbiter of what counts as knowledge, the need to keep up with new thinking in a new century, and how perspectives about the capacity of practitioners for theorising practice can contribute to the development of Sen’s (1999) theory of human capability as a means of economic sustainability. I shall go more deeply into these issues in a later lecture, but here I focus on three: