HOW DO I JUSTIFY MY CONTRIBUTIONS TO NEW INSTITUTIONAL EPISTEMOLOGIES FOR A NEW SCHOLARSHIP OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE?

A paper presented at the symposium

INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH: HOW DO WE INFLUENCE PROCESSES OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION THROUGH THE CREATION OF ACADEMIC PRACTITIONERS’ LIVING EDUCATIONAL THEORIES OF PRACTICE?

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Introduction

This paper is part of my ongoing action enquiry into how I explain how I hold myself accountable for my work as I seek to contribute to the development of new epistemologies for a new scholarship of educational knowledge (Whitehead 2009). I conduct this enquiry in a range of contexts and with a range of participants: teachers in a South African township (McNiff 2010); teachers in European schools (see for example Roche 2007; Glenn 2006, both working in Ireland); zookeepers in South African zoos (McNiff in preparation); and teacher educators in South African and UK higher education (McNiff and Naidoo 2007). In this paper I wish to focus on what I am doing in UK higher education, for a specific reason. The reason is that, in York St John University, where I currently hold a part-time position, the policy intent is to develop a form of institutional research that will enable the university to evaluate its own practices. I hope to be involved in this. It is therefore my responsibility, and my need, to be clear about how I understand the concept ‘institutional research’ and what it involves. This paper therefore takes as its focus my desire to understand the nature and purposes of institutional research within a broader conceptual context of the nature and purposes of educational research; and within, of course, a broader political context of performativity and bureaucratic accountability (Ball 2008). My hope is that the kind of institutional research imagined at York St John University could provide an evidence base for what could become a new curriculum for Higher Education.

The paper therefore explores the idea of what might constitute a new curriculum for Higher Education, what needs to be done to develop one, and what some of the implications may be. It also takes the form of a report of work in progress, and, as such, is presented with a view to inviting critical responses from peers as to its scholarly and practical merit, and its potential transformational capacity for informing new thinking and practices. I would welcome any critical responses to the paper as it will appear on my website shortly.

First, to locate my study, I outline my background and professional contexts.
Background and professional contexts for the research

As an independent researcher, I have been involved informally in higher education for over twenty years. Some time from the last four years have been spent in formal settings: the first three in St Mary’s University College, Twickenham, and now in York St John University, York. My work has been to support the professional learning of academic and support staff using an action research approach. This has involved the supervision of academic practitioners’ higher degree study programmes, and encouraging them to develop their capacity to exercise their educational influence in others’ learning and practices. An evidence base is now developing to show that this may be happening. This includes the following three examples from the published accounts of St Mary’s academic staff. Alex Sinclair (2009) explains how he is influencing students’ learning see also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THua6Ywoswc. Julie Pearson (2009) explains how she has learnt to encourage others to develop their capacity for critical thinking: see also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2JS5Gl6sG_w and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ejBrGm39Ysk. Jane Renowden (2009) explains how she has developed epistemological accountability: see also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yND2Ra7vdhQ&feature=related. A key aspect of this evidence base is that the examples show the link between the staff members’ commitments to improving the quality of their professional learning in order to influence the capacity of teachers in schools and college settings also to improve theirs. They do this from an understanding that the desire to improve practice is the basis for improved learning. However, the evidence base needs to be stronger in demonstrating these links, and, as part of my continuing support of some of the staff from St Mary’s who are engaged in their doctoral programmes, I try to enable them and myself to find ways of doing so.

I also bring my learning from the previous experiences of working with St Mary’s staff to my present work in York St John. The beauty of the York St John context lies, for me, in its strong institutional commitments to the ongoing professional learning of staff in the form of their self-evaluations of their work, which they submit to the stringent social evaluation of their peers, with a view to improving the quality of learning and educational experience for all (Armstrong 2009). It is this core commitment, and its transformation into live social practices that, in my understanding, forms the basis for a new curriculum for higher education. The ‘newness’ lies in the sense that the curriculum is (1) grounded in relational practices and is (2) communicated as a living form of practice.

However, these ideas need to be theorised rigorously in order for what could be a new curriculum for higher education to have credibility in the eyes of the educational research community; therefore, and to develop the ideas in the paper, let me outline my understanding of how this may be done. This will involve explaining how this approach to curriculum may be justified, especially in terms of the significance of its potential influence for new social practices that may contribute to the development of a more peaceful and productive world.

Theorisations of the nature of curriculum
I will first outline my understandings (albeit in summarised form) of (1) the changing nature of theorisations of curriculum; (2) the nature of curriculum formation, and the way different conceptualisations may or may not have significance for issues such as how educational research may influence processes of social transformation.

1 The nature of curriculum: a traditional perspective

It is generally acknowledged that the idea of curriculum may be understood in different ways. My own understanding of curriculum has developed throughout my professional life. In my early 1970s days as a teacher I understood curriculum as a timetable, or syllabus, a view critiqued even then in the contemporary literatures, for example, by Lawton (1975), as follows:

One view which was until recently generally accepted, was that the curriculum of a school was what was officially taught in lessons. According to this view, if you wanted to know about the school curriculum you would look carefully at the timetable. (Lawton 1975: 6)

My views changed when, in the 1980s, as a deputy head teacher, I was given responsibility for introducing a new subject, Personal and Social Education (PSE), into our school curriculum. From my initially limited view of curriculum, I saw PSE as a subject, or topic, to be incorporated into the syllabus. This stance, however, even then felt inappropriate, so, to help me clarify my understanding of what I was supposed to be doing, I attended an extended course with Leslie Button, renowned for his seminal work on PSE and action research. He spoke of pupils doing their action research into their own practices (Button 1974). I was intrigued by the ideas about action research and its relationship with what I was then beginning to understand as a good social order, and decided to pursue the ideas further in a possible doctoral programme. I therefore sought out universities who offered action research on their curricula, and registered at the University of Bath with Jack Whitehead as my supervisor; Jack was at that time actively publishing in action research (for example, Whitehead 1976). My developing studies, as is the nature of doctoral work, involved wider reading, and I began to encounter new ideas, including those of Pring, who was also writing about PSE (Pring 1984). Pring now helped me to understand that PSE was a cross-curricular theme, not a subject. This led me further to appreciate that curriculum should not be seen as a syllabus or timetable so much as the development of a socio-political culture.

These ideas have developed further over the years. I have come to agree with Elliott (1998), who, drawing on the ideas of Stenhouse (1975), remarked that ‘the humanities curriculum in schools should be viewed as a framework which supported the study of human values rather than “objective facts”’ (Elliott 1998: 8). Elliott also draws on Peters’ (1966) understandings of ‘educational aims as implying the values and principles which define the process of education rather than its extrinsic outcomes’ (Elliott 1998: 9). Interestingly, and in the same realm of discourse, a piece in Times Higher Education (2009) reports the failure of the Outcomes-Based Education (OBE) experiment in South Africa (where I also work), an initiative that I have critiqued as fundamentally flawed because of its focus on the teacher as agent
whose task is to change others’ behaviours, rather than on the learner who learns for themselves while supported by a teacher – see McNiff (2008).

Indeed, subsequent study has led me to understand that the theoretical stances of the scholars mentioned so far in relation to conceptualisations of curriculum have been from the same externalist and propositional perspective as the apparently failed OBE experiment: they have theorised other people’s practices on behalf of those people, instead of encouraging them to learn about and theorise their own practices for themselves; and they have spoken about the origin, nature and uses of curriculum without actually showing the living realities of their ideas in practice or their active theorisation of the ideas as they transform into practice. This understanding developed for me through working with ideas in the literatures, and with Whitehead, who has consistently called for a reconceptualisation of educational theory (see Whitehead 2009). He argues for living forms of educational theory, constituted by the descriptions and explanations that practitioners offer for their practices (see also Whitehead 2008). I agree with this view, from an understanding that the externalist, propositional theories of scholars such as Elliott, Lawton, Pring and Stenhouse may be incorporated into, but not stand in place of, the living theories of practitioners as those practitioners offer accounts for their professional learning and the development of their living epistemologies of practice.

This understanding brings me to my own conceptualisation of curriculum, from a generative transformational perspective.

2 The nature of curriculum: a generative transformational perspective

My view, like Coles (2003), is that curriculum should be viewed as ‘the sum of all the activities, experiences and learning opportunities for which an institution ... or a teacher (such as a faculty member) takes responsibility’ (no page). Further, I understand curriculum to be, first, a policy statement referring to the intended realisation of the values of an organism such as an individual, a collective, an organisation, or any social formation; and second, a set of practices that enables the realisation of those values to take place. I shall speak about how this happens shortly, but first I give a rationale for these conceptualisations of curriculum.

These views have developed out of a wider understanding of the interrelated nature of all things (Bateson 1979) and the generative transformational nature of evolutionary processes (Chomsky 1986). I have outlined these ideas in a range of texts (for example, McNiff 2007; McNiff and Whitehead 2006), and most recently in McNiff (2009). There I have especially engaged with the idea of relationship as the grounds for a form of epistemology: a view that sees knowledge as embodied in the relational practices of all the members of the social formation, and communicated through their articulation of their individual living theories of practice. Those accounts can then come to stand as an evidence base that fully vindicates, in symbolic and real-world experiential form, the intent of the participants in the community through the transformational potentials of the accounts for the real-life learning of others. In this regard I find useful some of the ideas of Durkheim (2001) regarding *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, as reported by Power (2009):
Individual minds can meet and commune only by coming out of themselves through movement. The homogeneity of these movements ‘makes the group aware of itself’. That homogeneity, once established, serves to symbolise the representations. Without these symbols, such feelings and representations cannot endure. The movements must be inscribed on ‘lasting things’ – material objects or designs on the body that can embody the representations. Ritual alone provides the generative ground for experience of the moral community; the sacred objects that embody collective representations stand for nothing other than the community’s sense of itself. (Durkheim 2001, as reported by Power 2009: 47)

While I do not transpose these ideas directly to the idea of the creation of individuals’ living educational theories, or to a view of curriculum, I do see similarities, especially in the idea of curriculum as ‘the generative ground for experience of the moral community’ (in whatever way the community understands its moral life, or its values base), and as the symbolisation of the community’s sense of itself. I also engage further with already established ideas (McNiff 2007) about generative transformational processes: that a finite number of elements can form an infinite number of innovative practices, an understanding that I drew from Chomsky, who in turn learned them from Humboldt. Chomsky (for example 1965, 1986) speaks of how a finite number of linguistic elements can form an entire language, and theorises this capacity for iterative transformation as generative transformational capacity. I use the term, like Goethe (see Bortoft 1996), to refer to the generative transformational capacity of any thing to transform itself into a more developed form of itself (I see all things as living: inanimate ‘things’ are in dynamic living relation with animate ‘things’ and in dynamic relation with the living earth). Thus, for example, I see, in a conceptual domain, the generative transformational capacity of values and logics to transform into epistemologies; and, in a practical domain, I see the generative transformational capacity of people to realise their values as living practices, which, in turn – and referring to Durkheim’s understandings – come to act as the symbolic representation of the person’s or social formation’s sense of themselves.

So what relevance has this to the idea of contributing to new institutional epistemologies for a new scholarship of educational knowledge, which is the focus of this paper? The relevance, as I see it, is in the idea of the living processes of curriculum formation, and how this may be achieved through the systematic methodologies of action research.

Curriculum formation

From the discussion so far, any thoughts about curriculum formation need first to engage critically with questions of the kind,

- What should we be doing?
- Why should we do it?
- How should we do it?
- How will we evaluate whether it is worthwhile?
- How do we modify our ideas and practices in light of our evaluations?
• How do we develop our ideas into statements and practices that are symbolic representations of our values and intents?

These kinds of questions are reminiscent of, and directly relevant to, the kinds of questions outlined by Whitehead (1989), and developed by McNiff and Whitehead (2006) and Whitehead and McNiff (2006), as follows:

• What is my concern?
• Why am I concerned?
• How do I gather data to show the situation as it is and as it develops?
• What do I do about the situation?
• How do I ensure that any conclusions I draw are reasonably fair and accurate?
• How do I explain the significance of my findings?
• How do I modify my ideas and practices in light of my evaluations?

These are the kind of questions I ask myself throughout my work, regardless of its setting. Those questions, however, take on special significance in higher education, as I now explain.

I noted earlier that, after a long time in a non-institutional role, I entered formal higher education with a specific purpose, which was to influence the development of new epistemologies of educational knowledge (Whitehead 2009). I did this from an understanding that the Academy is one of the most powerful institutions for setting what counts as legitimate knowledge and who counts as a legitimate knower. My experiences of higher education have been largely that, in its institutional form, it is often a site for the exercise of power, although many individuals demonstrate caring and compassionate attitudes to one another. The exercise of corporate power is often vividly communicated through systematic ‘othering’ practices. A considerable literature exists that shows I am not alone in this perception. A vigorous critique is especially visible in the work of critical scholars such as Bourdieu (1988) and Foucault (1980). Jansen’s (2009) experience is symptomatic: speaking of his experiences in a South African university, he says:

... regnant epistemologies within the institution [were] the kinds of knowledge that were strange and distant, sometimes offensive. I did not understand the positivist impulse applied to decision making and the deployment of rigid organizational logic that substituted for genuine deliberation. I could not access the kind of science that accepted the world as given, fixed, and knowable. ... It was the link between knowledge and authority that disturbed most – knowledge graded for truth depending on who was speaking and how high up the hierarchy the speaker was located. (Jansen 2009: 20)

My understanding, therefore, from the perspective of the transformational potential of epistemologies to change into values-informed social practices, is that, in order for the Academy as an institution to change its social practices, it first needs to interrogate and transform its underlying epistemological practices. This would, of course, mean interrogating its values base, and how values are communicated as
social purposes; and developing the capacity to critique its underpinning forms of logic. (This of course begs the question of whether the Academy actually wants to change its practices: whether to maintain its traditional positioning as the holder of power/knowledge (Foucault 1980) in the interests of social reproduction, or whether to position itself as a powerful agency for social transformation.)

However, I do not see ‘the Academy’ as a homogeneous entity, a faceless institution that exists external to me. I am part of the Academy, together with other colleagues, real human beings with the capacity to think for ourselves. From the ideas about the generative transformational nature of evolutionary processes discussed above, I understand that it is we, collectives of democratically-thinking and fair-minded persons, who hold the real power to transform our lives. We exercise that transformative power to change our institutions in ways that become the realisation of our own educational values. It then becomes the responsibility of all of us to explain how and why we hold the values we do, and do the things we do. I therefore reasoned that if I could influence the thinking of practitioners in the Academy, whose job is to influence the learning of others, and persuade them to show systematically how they hold themselves accountable for their ideas and practices, then I would stand a better chance of influencing what counts as a decent society (Margalit 1996). This commitment is commensurable with the ideas of critical thinkers such as those mentioned in this paper: Chomsky (1986), Foucault (1980, 2001), Said (1991), and Zinn (2002), who state that it is the responsibility of intellectuals to position themselves as initiators of critical conversations about what kind of social order people wish to have and how they might achieve their goals. My view is therefore that, if we wish to transform the societies and cultures we create and legitimise, we first need to transform our underpinning epistemologies. Social and cultural transformation, for me, begins with the individual’s decision, together with others, to engage with the creation of their own knowledge in relation to what they believe is worth knowing and how this knowledge comes to be known.

This, then, forms the basis of my work. It also forms the basis of how I am conceptualising the work as the possible beginnings of a new curriculum for higher education. While I am not the first to relate the concepts of curriculum and action research (Stenhouse, 1975; McKernan, 1991, and Elliott 1998 did this a long time ago), I do think the demonstration of the linking of the concepts in action, and their living realisation in the form of peoples’ practices, may give rise to the development of such a curriculum.

Building on previous learning, I can now theorise my practice more adequately as I continue to encourage academic practitioners to engage in their action enquiries. Specifically this involves finding ways to open up creative spaces within institutional settings where people may engage critically with their own thinking about improving their practice and generating knowledge of their practice. I do this from my commitment to an idea communicated by Foucault (2001) who speaks of parrhesia, the capacity and duty of all to speak their truth with integrity. I also share the views of Zinn (2002) who speaks of the need for critique, for dissent, to withstand the power of self-serving groups in positions of governmental power who wish to subdue critical thinking: ‘They want us to act as if we were born yesterday. They
want us to forget the history of our government. Because if you forget history, if you were born yesterday, then you'll believe anything' (Zinn 2002: 52–3).

I do not ‘believe anything’. I believe what is commensurable with my own values base. I bring this attitude into my professional work, and have done so consistently in all my work contexts and settings: in the University of Limerick (McNiff 2007), in the Good Hope Campus of False Bay College in Khayelitsha (McNiff 2008), in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (McNiff and Naidoo 2007), in St Mary’s University College (McNiff 2009) and now in York St John University. Participants themselves explain that this form of encounter enables them to develop their understandings of themselves as in relation with others. These informal meetings that encourage relational knowledge of the other form an appropriate context for the assimilation and creation of substantive knowledges. Thus ‘know-that’ (Ryle 1949) is incorporated into knowledge of the self (Polanyi 1958). The following video clips from participants in Khayelitsha in South Africa are examples of a new multimedia form of evidence base, to be built up over time, that show these processes in action – see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYty6rsiOGA; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FNIK7BUHyFo.

This growing knowledge base can show the transformative power of individuals acting with educational intent, and with educational responsibility (Whitehead 2009), first to one another, and then to increasingly wider circles of participants. This knowledge base is now world-wide (see the websites http://www.actionresearch.net and http://www.jeanmcniff.com as perhaps the main compendium of practitioners’ accounts of how they are transforming their thinking and practices in the interests of social and educational justice for themselves and others). It is a wonderful example of ‘people power’, a theme that is increasingly heard in contemporary discourses as a means of democratically inspired social transformation (see also Chomsky 1996). Furthermore, the knowledge base itself has academic legitimacy, as demonstrated by the fact that a keynote symposium at the British Educational Research Association has been devoted to the communication of the ideas (Whitehead 2009), as well as the present symposium of which this paper is a part.

I am hoping that, out of the establishment of this knowledge base, and the dissemination of its ideas, a new curriculum for higher education will emerge. The form of this new curriculum, however, is not abstract or virtual; it does not exist only in the sense that ideas are explained in a propositional form of text. It exists also in the sense that individuals and collectives offer explanations for their lives through the way they live those lives, in consciously acknowledged relation with others. Their work-based reports become the symbolic representations for the way they justify those lives and demonstrate their accountability in their interactions with others. When those reports are located within an organisation, they become the curriculum for the organisation: they explain what is to be done and how it can be done. They embody the values of the organisation, and offer explanations for how those values may emerge as living practices.
Conclusion

This, then, is how I theorise my work, as I embark on this new phase of my professional life of working with others, in a higher education setting, to explore with them the kind of values we feel are worth realising in practice, and how we can realise them as an emergent form of institutional research. Through our institution-based practices we find ways of creating our study times into realisations of what we believe constitutes a good society, and we bring this learning into our wider pedagogical and institutional practices in our desires to create our workplace as such a society. We form our own curriculum, and, from our understanding that our local practices made public may influence the thinking of the social formation of the Academy, we commend our ideas to you, for your consideration about whether you may wish to do the same. What works for us may work for you; you will know that it does only if you try it out for yourself.

However …

It is important to test the validity of any knowledge claims against the critical feedback of peers. I said in the introduction that I would welcome any critical responses to the paper. I would ask you to respond, via my email address, and bearing in mind the need to articulate negotiated standards of judgement. The standards I have in mind at present include the following:

• Do I demonstrate, as Zinn (2002) recommends, that I was not born yesterday, but am able to critique unauthorised regimes of power as communicated in ‘othering’ epistemologies?
• Do I show, as Habermas (1976) recommends, that I am speaking authentically and with sincerity; that I am telling the truth in relation to the evidence base I have produced; that I show understanding for the need of knowledge of a normative background?
• Do I explore my own potentials for critical reflexivity, as recommended by Winter (1989)?
• Do I observe Lather’s (1991) call for ironic validity by showing how I am able to critique my own epistemological stance?
• Do I demonstrate moral accountability in my conceptualisation of curriculum as a living practice?

You may feel that other standards are more appropriate, in which case we can begin a useful discussion about how we judge ideas and the practices they inform. These discussions themselves can contribute to the formation of a new curriculum for higher education, a living experience that is formed and communicated through the lives of real people as they find ways of creating a future that is right for them and their children.

References

the creation of academic practitioners’ living educational theories of practice’,
British Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, University of Manchester, September.


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